

01277

1962/11/28

DECLASSIFIED 2007 - Miss Kuchair

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Nov. 26, 1962
10:30 - 1:30 PM
USSSR Mission

SUBJECT: Meeting with Mikoyan

PARTICIPANTS: USSR - Amb. Stepanov USSSR - Mr. Mikoyan

Mr. McClell

Mr. Zorin

Amb. Yeat

Mr. Kuznetsov

Miss Kuchair

Mr. Mandelovich

transferred Mr. Zhuravtsov

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/LMB

VIEWED BY 10/10/72 DATE 2/2/92

CLASSIFY () DECLASSIFY

EXEMPT () DECLASSIFY IN PART

EXEMPT () Non-responsive info.

1. EO or PA exemptions

TS authority to:

CLASSIFY AS _____, OADR

1. DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

Cat. B - Transferred to _____

with additional access

controlled by S/S

Cat. C - Caption and custody

retained by S/S

Reviewed by: Elijah Kahn Jr.

Date: 2/2/92

Mr. Mikoyan began the discussion, remarking that he was taking part

in these negotiations without plan, but he had studied the US draft declaration and would like to make some comments on it to speed up that deliberations. The impression of the Soviet representatives was the the United States wished to procrastinate, but he would be glad if this impression were erroneous. The Soviet Union had proposed a protocol and still considered this the best form of finalizing the settlement of this situation, but apparently the United States objected to such a form. He said, Soviet representatives did not know the reasons behind this objection, but could guess what they were. As for arguments raised against it, they were invalid. A protocol was certainly preferable, where all three parties could be signatories. However, to facilitate agreement, the Soviet Union was prepared to accept the form of declarations which would be presented for approval to the UN. Now, the issue was the

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1. EO Exemptions

1. PA Exemptions

MR Cases Only:

EO Citations

TS authority to:

() CLASSIFY AS () S or () C OADR

() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C OADR

contents of the declaration, and the U. S. draft declaration was poor.

Mr. Mikoyan proceeded to list the main points on which objections arose:

1. The US draft omitted or did not adequately reflect points raised in the exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev.
2. It placed new conditions upon the promise of non-invasion, which had not been raised before.
3. It attempted to introduce the legalization of overflights of Cuba. To attempt to include such a provision into a document to be presented to the US was impossible.
4. The draft ignored Soviet-Cuban proposals which--though not literally expressed in the exchange of letters between the President and Khrushchev--were implied in it.

Making the promise of non-invasion conditional upon actions of Cuba directed against the United States (or other areas in the Caribbean, Ambassador Zarin added) was a direct deviation from the understanding reached through the exchange of letters and rejection of obligations undertaken with respect to non-invasion.

The U.S. draft, Mr. Mikoyan continued, contained references to the subversive activities of Cuba, but did not mention such activities directed against Cuba. Everybody was aware that the U.S. was committing subversive acts against Cuba, while the U.S. draft was silent on that score. Castro insisted--and the Soviet Union fully agreed--that if such a reference was made, it had to apply to all parties. The provision should state that